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Title of Project:	Bribing in Supply Queues
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Précis of 100 Words or Less:	The paper examines the possibility of curbing supply line bribes in the public sector through supervision and through introducing competition among delivery agents. It is shown that a supervisory solution eludes the problem because no hard evidence of the reduction of corruption can be established for this type of offense. It is then shown that using more than one supplier reduces the bribe rate and the waiting period for both bribe-payers and others; and the aggregate gain of consumers exceeds the cost of hiring additional suppliers.
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