

Name of Researcher:	Chang, Eric C.C.
Citizenship of Researcher:	Taiwan
Telephone Number of Researcher:	517-432-2047
E-mail Address of Researcher:	echang@msu.edu
Employer or Sponsoring Organization:	Department of Political Science Michigan State University
Address of Employer or Sponsoring Organization:	303 South Kedzie Hall, MSU East Lansing MI 48824
Title of Project:	Electoral Uncertainty and Political Corruption
Type of Product (e.g., Book, Paper, Documentary Film, Serial Article):	Research Paper
Précis of 100 Words or Less:	The current empirical research on the causes of political corruption uses an aggregated index of perceived corruption at the cross-national level and is thus incapable of explaining what factors drive <i>individual</i> politicians to engage in politically corrupt activities. This paper seeks to fill this vacuum by hypothesizing and testing empirically whether the increase of electoral uncertainty pushes candidates to seek illegal rents. In contradiction to the conventional wisdom, which suggests that electoral uncertainty has an anti-corruption effect, I argue that when personal votes are expensive yet critical for incumbents, their electoral uncertainty regarding their prospects of remaining in office actually increases their propensity to corruption in a curvilinear way. An empirical test using duration analysis with individual-level data from Italy provides substantial support for this theory.
Start Date:	March, 2003
Projected Completion Date:	First Draft completed in August, 2003
Presentation or Publication Date:	Currently under review in a refereed journal
Presentation or Publication Venue:	

Original Language:	English
Projected Date of Availability in English:	Available now.
Relation to Other Efforts, Follow-on Projects (If Any):	Golden, Miriam, and Eric C.C. Chang. 2001. "Competitive Corruption: Factional Conflict and Political Malfeasance in Postwar Italian Christian Democracy." <i>World Politics</i> 53 (4): 588-622.
Available in Hardcopy or Electronically (Y/N):	Yes