

Trafficking, Slavery and Peacekeeping

The Need for a Comprehensive
Training Program

A Conference Report



Turin, Italy
May 9-10, 2002

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UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
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TraCCC

**Transnational Crime and
Corruption Center**



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**UN Interregional Crime and
Justice Research Institute**

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About the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

UNICRI is a United Nations entity mandated to contribute, through research, training, field activities and the collection, exchange and dissemination of information, to the formulation and implementation of improved policies in the field of crime prevention and control, due regard being paid to the integration of such policies within broader policies for socio-economic change and development, and to the protection of human rights. The Institute assists intergovernmental, governmental and non-governmental organizations in their efforts in this regard. In recent years, UNICRI has been conducting several activities targeted at the prevention and control of TIP, such as a major international conference "New Frontiers of Crime: Trafficking in Human Beings and New Forms of Slavery" (October 1999), research projects on TIP in the Philippines, the Czech Republic and Poland, Benin, Nigeria and Togo. UNICRI has also been carrying out a model technical co-operation project aiming at strengthening institutional capacity against TIP in Nigeria (origin country) and establishing joint law enforcement/justice task forces between Nigeria e European destination countries".

About the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center

Founded in 1995, TraCCC's goal is to improve understanding of the causes and scope of transnational crime and corruption and to propose well-grounded policy. TraCCC's work to date has focused on the analysis of transnational organized crime and corruption in the countries of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. TraCCC works with the public, media, law enforcement, policymaking, legislative, judicial, academic and business communities. To undertake this kind of collaborative work, the center has partnered with the best scholars and practitioners in Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia through seven multidisciplinary research centers housed at the eminent Universities of the region.

TraCCC also advises numerous American and multilateral governmental and non-governmental organizations engaged in studying and combating transnational crime and corruption, including the U.S. Departments of Justice, State and Treasury; the U.S. Congress; the Asia Foundation; the Korean Government; Transparency International; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the United Nations; the Organization of American States; the International Organization for Migration; the U.S. armed services; and the World Bank; as well as numerous US and international scholars, practitioners and advocacy groups.

TraCCC also has a strong focus on education. The center hosts visiting scholars and international visitors throughout the year that are researching various aspects of organized crime and corruption. More recently, TraCCC has established a M.A. program in transnational organized crime and corruption through the Schools of International Service and Public Affairs at American University. Finally, TraCCC and its local affiliates have co-sponsored numerous seminars and roundtable discussions, instituted collaborative research, developed partnerships, and established an extensive database of colleagues in many disciplines in order to maintain dialogue among members of the international community concerned with the political, economic and societal cost of transnational crime and corruption.

Acknowledgements

The principal meeting organizers would like to take this opportunity to thank all that made this meeting of experts a success. The organizers must recognize the generous support of the US Departments of State and Justice that made this meeting possible. We would also like to thank Angela Patrignani, Vittoria Luda, Anna Favero, and their fellow staff workers at UNICRI for tirelessly and cheerfully attending to the many logistical and intellectual details such meetings generate. Finally, we must recognize that this meeting and report would not have been a success without the preparation and dedication of the experts who participated in the meeting.

The designations employed in the report, which are in conformity with United Nations practice, and the presentation of material therein, do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNICRI and TraCCC concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The responsibility for opinions expressed rests solely with the relevant expert(s), and inclusion in this report does not constitute an endorsement by UNICRI and TraCCC.

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List of Abbreviations

Civilian Police Unit	CivPol
Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UN)	UN/DPKO
European Union	EU
Intergovernmental Organizations	IGOs
International Catholic Migration Commission	ICMC
International Labor Organization	ILO
International Organization for Migration	IOM
International Police Task Force (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	IPTF
NATO Kosovo Force	KFOR
NATO Stabilization Force (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	SFOR
Non-governmental organization	NGO
North American Treaty Organization	NATO
Office of Internal Oversight Services (UN)	UN/OIOS
Office of Inspector General	OIG
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	OSCE
Organization of the United Nations	UN
Peacekeeping operation	PKO
Southeast Europe	SEE
Southern European Cooperative Initiative	SECI
Special Trafficking Operation Program (Bosnia and Herzegovina)	STOP
Trafficking and Prostitution Investigation Unit (Kosovo)	TPIU
Transnational Crime and Corruption Center	TraCCC
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights	UN/OHCHR
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	UNHCR
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute	UNICRI
United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	UNMIBH
United Nations Mission in Kosovo	UNMIK
World Health Organization	WHO

Key Findings

- One aspect that is at the earliest stages of recognition is the trafficking in persons into peacekeeping areas. Three observations characterize the relations between PKOs and trafficking in persons. First, in contemporary PKOs, the international community is the primary (or only) source of law enforcement, making PKOs the primary law enforcement authority for combating trafficking. Second, because PKO staffs are paid at a high wage in the context of the localities they serve in, they knowingly or unknowingly serve as a primary source of demand for trafficked persons in brothels and domestic labor, for example. Finally, in some cases, members of PKOs have been implicated in trafficking themselves. Examples include peacekeeping units transporting victims and contractors supporting peacekeepers purchasing trafficked women and children.
- Despite the best efforts of some Member States and related institutions, strategies to form a comprehensive anti-trafficking framework for PKOs are falling well short of the demand. The deficiencies identified during the experts meeting included shortfalls or absence of political will, uneven application of existing training regimens within and across institutions, and a failure to engage local institutions in a fruitful manner.
- Political will is vital for the implementation of successful anti-trafficking operations (e.g. law enforcement or prosecution). In return, the implementation of successful anti-trafficking programs reinforces the political will to support their continued success. Political will, in its many forms of expression, can reduce the behaviors that condone and support trafficking and related forms of organized crime.
- Addressing such a need is further hampered by a lack of knowledge of ongoing or proposed training efforts across measures of effectiveness. The discussion highlighted the necessity of establishing a transparent and effective anti-trafficking training framework for all members of peacekeeping operations and corresponding local institutions around the globe in order to (1) raise visibility/awareness of the issue within peacekeeping regions and (2) to create or bolster anti-trafficking capacities. Training can deliver the information necessary to create a level of awareness about an issue, and training can ensure that vital constituencies receive the knowledge and tools necessary to achieve change.

Introduction

In early September of 2001, the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center at American University (TraCCC) held a two-day conference, sponsored by the McCormick-Tribune Foundation, that examined how transnational organized crime affects PKOs.¹ Both during and outside the conference sessions, the topic of trafficking in persons vis-à-vis peacekeeping continued to arise, especially in the context of the PKOs in SEE. Those discussions drove the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and TraCCC to host a workshop of international experts that would address how the trafficking in persons interacts with PKOs.

The phrase “interaction with PKOs” is deliberately abstract to capture the three different links between PKOs and criminal organizations. First, organized crime often is or aids entities opposed to the authority vested in PKOs, and thus hold an adversarial relationship with PKOs. Likewise, when a PKO’s mandate calls for executive policing, such as in Kosovo, the adversarial relationship with PKOs is even clearer. Second, PKOs and their support services often become a source of demand that fuels illicit markets, including the trafficking in persons (especially women). Finally, one cannot ignore that members of PKOs

¹ It is important to note that peace missions are comprised of personnel drawn from member states and private contractors that staff not only military units but also civilian police forces, election monitors, deminers, human rights observers, and other civilian structures. For more on PKOs, their composition, and mandates, see the website of the UN/DPKO (www.un.org/depts/dpko/) and, for an independent view on CivPol in particular, see Annika Hansen, *From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations*, Adelphi Paper 343 (London: IISS), 2002.

sometimes engage in or purposely allow these criminal enterprises, such as the trafficking in persons, to flourish.

Taking this into consideration, the meeting of experts that gathered May 9th and 10th of 2002 in Turin, Italy had three objectives (see Appendix A for a list of participants). First, the group explored these relationships in order to determine their scope and how they impacted the trafficking in persons. Second, the expert group identified critical problems that hindered efforts to combat the trafficking in persons in peacekeeping zones. Finally, the working group assisted UNICRI and TraCCC in formulating a response to these problems through a comprehensive training regimen. Training served as the binding issue for identifying responses as training directly addressed the deficiencies the group identified. Training can, for example, deliver the information necessary to create a level of awareness about an issue, and training can ensure that vital constituencies receive the knowledge and tools necessary to achieve change.

The selection of SEE served as a means towards an end because the organizers of the meeting felt that the development of a program applicable to all PKOs required concrete information and lessons from a specific frame of reference. The SEE region provided two established PKOs with both UN and NATO mandates, active trafficking syndicates, and a wealth of research and information about how trafficking interacted with PKOs in the region. As one expert put it, the SEE region was an appropriate selection because it served as a “microcosm of the trafficking cycle” and provided an insight into the larger transnational nature of trafficking syndicates.

Trafficking in persons in the SEE region, as a participant from the region noted, is clearly a form of organized crime. By defining the issue as such, the participants hoped that observers and practitioners engaging in the issue would move beyond definitional issues and push discussions further to decide how best to apply knowledge of combating organized crime to the fight against trafficking. In order to meet this lofty goal, the meeting opened with some fixed, short presentations that provided information and identified problems, holding the entire second day in reserve for discussion of the problems and fashioning concrete recommendations as solutions to the problems.

Probing Relationships

Following the structure of the meeting, the report opens with some basic information. The section addresses how transnational organized crime and the informal sector operate in the SEE region, then moves into a survey of trafficking in persons in the region and the involvement of PKO personnel in trafficking. The section concludes with a brief look at the responses to trafficking in the SEE region.

Transnational Organized Crime in the Region

The meeting opened with a discussion of transnational organized crime as a significant problem in the region and for PKOs in particular. Straddling the European and Asian land masses, the geographic location of the region means it has traditionally served as a hub for legitimate trade and illegal smuggling. The collapse of the eastern bloc regimes, especially the fragmentation of the majority of the Yugoslav confederation, also fed the growth of transnational organized crime in the region. Further, the series of wars that racked the region during the 1990s fueled

smuggling and stunted the development of the rule of law. As a local observer noted, numerous leaders, most of who relied on cronyism and corruption to maintain their rule, competed with one another during the 1990s and this, in part, led to the collapse of trust in government amongst citizens in the region. A consequence of all these factors was the formation of a large informal sector that today serves as the setting for numerous forms of transnational organized crime.

Just about every form of transnational criminal activity is present in the SEE region. The most prevalent form of crime in the region remains smuggling. Smuggling of drugs, arms, and even cigarettes served as the most lucrative forms of transnational crime throughout the 1990s, while the smuggling and trafficking in persons became more prolific towards the end of the decade. One participant noted that money laundering is also a staple of criminal enterprises in the region, and combined with smuggling has made the region a “major investment point” for transnational criminal organizations. Through smuggling and money laundering, criminal organizations indigenous to the region have forged relationships with other criminal groups in northern Europe, Turkey, and Italy. The Albanian criminal clans, in particular, are said to have an organization that stretches from Western Europe and the US to the Middle East and the former Soviet Union.

Organized crime fuels corruption at all levels of government in the region². For example, one participant with experience in the region noted that a strong link appeared to exist between some leaders of the Kosovo

² For more information on this point see also Louise Shelley, *Hearing on Sex Trade: Trafficking of Women and Children in Europe and the United States*, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki: June 28 1999, available at www.american.edu/traccc/pdfs/HTMLs/testimony699.htm.

nationalist parties and known organized crime groups, though the participant was quick to note that this statement should not serve as a generalization of politics in the region. Rather, the statement serves as one of numerous illustrations of the ways that organized crime has developed links with certain politicians in the region's governments. The links have been used to foil the efforts of local and international law enforcement to combat trafficking as well as to facilitate the operation of trafficking syndicates in the region.

Two conclusions are drawn from this brief survey. First, it illustrates how transnational organized crime serves as an impediment and challenge to the PKOs in the region. Aside from the corruption problems in the region, organized crime is another source of authority that PKOs must contend with in the region. Second, it is within this larger cacophony of transnational criminal enterprises that trafficking in persons operates. Hence, these transnational criminal connections form a larger informal market that traffickers and other transnational criminals use in their activities (e.g., document fraud experts, money launderers, and front companies).

Trafficking in Persons in the Region

The trafficking in persons is a criminal industry found around the world, affecting almost every country. While it is characterized in different ways, the trafficking in persons is fundamentally an issue of human rights and migration. Trafficking is one of the most significant human rights violations. Trafficking enslaves people, forcing them to work for little or no earnings in squalid and unsafe conditions for long hours, all the while keeping its victims isolated from the outside world. Enslavement best summarizes the fundamental character of trafficking and, as

one participant noted, serves as the answer to those who dismiss trafficking as “voluntary”—put simply, one does not voluntarily become a slave. Trafficking also causes severe physical and psychological harm, with traffickers using violence, rape, addiction, threats, and other forms of trauma to maintain control over their victims.

While experts cite a number of social, economic, and political causes of trafficking, most experts see trafficking as rooted in the inability of people to migrate for political, financial, geographical, or other reasons. The globalized world we live in today demonstrates to people around the world the potential benefits of migration to other regions of the globe, and provides the mechanisms to do so. Restrictive immigration policies and the significant financial costs of international migration, however, often stand in the way of reaching these goals and create an opportunity for a wide range of informal or illicit “facilitators” of migration. Put another way, the gap between the increasing desire to migrate and the increasing inability to do so is most often filled with organized smuggling, and from these smuggling rackets are borne trafficking syndicates. Finally, it is important to recognize that, as one participant noted, the socioeconomic chaos of conflict and post-conflict situations fuel trafficking—an important fact for PKOs to keep in mind.

Trafficking is a serious issue in the SEE region³. Take this case example, just one many that participants provided:

³ On this topic see also: IOM, “Focus on the Balkans,” *Trafficking in Migrants* (Geneva: Autumn 2000), available at www.iom.int/iomwebsite/Publication/ServletSearchPublication?event=detail&id=440 and IOM, “New IOM Figures on the Global Scale of Trafficking” *Trafficking in Migrants* (Geneva: April 2001), available at <http://www.iom.int/iomwebsite/Publication/ServletSearchPublication?event=detail&id=543>.

A mother from the former Yugoslavia, aged 21, spoke with a recruiter who promised her a job in Italy earning a decent wage. She walked into Serbia to make the trip into Italy, but when she arrived she was locked into a house with 16 other women. Her captors used violence and abused her. She was beaten and raped repeatedly. Her captors then forced her to work in a brothel in Kosovo. In January of this year, a raid on the brothel freed her.

Thankfully, the story has a hopeful ending, as the woman was placed in a rescue shelter that rehabilitated and helped her to return home where she is recovering and trying to return to a normal life. But this is not the case for thousands of others, caught in trafficking syndicates in the region. One expert with experience in the region noted that in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia alone, a country slightly larger than the state of Vermont or Belgium geographically, local sources report the existence of over 200 brothels, many of which utilize trafficked women. Likewise, according to UN/OHCHR figures provided during the meeting, local NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina have identified over 900 brothels that each house between 4 and 25 women from abroad—or a total of between 3600 and 22500 persons—a good (but undetermined) number of whom are thought to have been trafficked from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina⁴.

But what, then, does a trafficking syndicate in the region look like? One expert provided a model of trafficking

broken into geographical stages. In the “hiring areas,” recruiters locate victims and entice them into the trafficking network with promises of great paying jobs or other inducements. Next, the victims traverse a transit area where sometimes they are “shunted” into exploitative working situations. Finally, the victims reach their destination or the “exploitation area,” where they are forced to work in brothels, sweatshops, farms, or other forms of exploitation. During each stage of this basic model, it is important to note that some person or group of persons is earning money from trafficking the victims. In application, the model shows that SEE is simultaneously a source, transit, and destination region.

The conflicts in the region since the early 1990s have resulted in millions of refugees and displaced persons that are vulnerable targets for trafficking rings. Refugee women in particular are often without or separated from family members, and as a result can become targets for abuse and trafficking. The inability to integrate legally in host communities or return to their countries of origin oftentimes leads refugee or returnee women to traffickers.

Some participants were more specific in their descriptions of the contours of trafficking in persons in the region, especially the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One participant from the region noted that, since 1995, most of the criminal activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina had shifted from the smuggling of drugs and arms to the trafficking in persons. However, another participant from the region noted that traffickers in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to move arms, drugs, and other contraband using the same methods and routes they use to move people. One surprising observation came from an expert from the region who noted that the owners of the brothels and bars “hosting” trafficked women were not the primary beneficiaries of

⁴ For more information on this issue see also Kanics J. “Arizona Market: Woman for Sale,” *Stop-traffic. News/Bosnia*, August 23, 2000 at fpmail.friends-partners.org/pipermail/stop-traffic/2000-August/000113.html.

the trade. In fact, this participant went so far as to consider the owners as victims because they are being forced to undertake a risky and brutish job for others. The participant then went on to note that the financial gains of local politicians and officials from trafficking far outpaced those of the owners, and that a large share of the earnings from trafficking went to organized crime groups residing outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another expert went on to note that there were strong connections between the rape camps of the Bosnian war and the methods used to hold women in brothels in the territory.⁵ The experts also agreed that the trafficking industry was changing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with many of the brothels going underground to avoid recent raids and prosecution. Such a turn of events, they predicted, will make the work of law enforcement much more difficult and will also complicate the work of NGO experts in the region who rely on observations drawn from numerous interviews with victims, the bar owners, and trusted law enforcement officials for their information.

Trafficking in women for sexual exploitation is not the only form of trafficking found in the region. One participant noted that the trafficking of children from the region is increasing in order to feed the organized begging rings in central and Western Europe. Another participant noted that Save the Children United Kingdom had recently estimated that over 80% of the persons trafficked between

⁵ According to several sources, the Serbian paramilitary forces operating in Bosnia used rape camps to systematically rape Muslim Bosnian women during the early 1990s, oftentimes leading to their death either at the hands of their captors or as a result of the injuries the victims sustained. The international community condemned the practice as a tactic promoting ethnic cleansing and has prosecuted those who ran the camps. For more, see Roy Gutman, "Rape Camps: Evidence Serb Leaders in Bosnia OKd Attacks," *Newsday*, 19 April 1993.

Albania and Italy were under the age of 18. Trafficking for all forms of exploitation, alongside migrant smuggling, exists throughout the SEE region.

The experts at the meeting illustrated the detrimental effects of trafficking on victims and on societies in the region. One expert spoke of how doctors are seeing more cases of congenital syphilis, a formerly rare condition, and mother-to-child AIDS—both changes are in part a result of the trafficking of women and girls for sexual exploitation to the region. Another noted that the increase in brothels with trafficked young women and girls, especially those with victims from outside the region, has led to a corresponding increase in divorces as men leave their wives to marry the younger women in the brothels.

Finally, the issue of corruption was one that many experts singled out for further discussion.⁶ One expert noted that a police chief of a city in the Bosnian Serb enclave was known to transport women for the traffickers personally—in his own car. The expert went on to say that interviews with trusted local police officers had shown that local police stations kept two registries of immigrants for the area. The first book was for IPTF inspectors, and the second book, kept secret from the IPTF, was for the police to know how much to extort the bar and brothel owners in a protection racket they ran. The second book contained at least 2000 names of trafficking victims, according to the expert.

Experts found similar patterns of activity in Kosovo, showing this is a problem that clearly is not limited to Bosnia

⁶ On the topic see also: Martina E. Vandenberg, *Testimony to the House Committee on International Relations- Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights*, 24 April 2002, at www.house.gov/international_relations/vand0424.htm.

and Herzegovina⁷. In fact, one participant noted that brothels opened in Pristina *before* peacekeepers even deployed there, in anticipation of the 600 or so verification officers that deployed ahead of the main force. The traffickers knew the officers would be men, as they needed military certifications to conduct the verification. Hence, the combination of the end of hostilities and the arrival of relatively rich PKO personnel drove the hasty establishment of brothels and, in turn, founded the links between UNMIK personnel and trafficking syndicates. Within this observation lies the most significant challenge, then, to the PKO in regards to trafficking—the fact that peacekeepers are often part of the problem. The next section examines this in more detail, while this section concludes with what efforts are being undertaken to combat trafficking in persons.

PKO engaging in Trafficking in Persons

The participants agreed that trafficking in persons is a serious issue challenging the SEE region as a whole, and many also noted that the PKOs had some culpability in the regional rise in trafficking in recent years⁸. Numerous media stories and testimonials from (mainly former) PKO personnel have recently painted this picture. The primary

⁷ For more see OSCE, *Background Report. Combating Trafficking in Kosovo*, (OSCE Mission in Kosovo, June 2001) at www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports and Brian Kenety, “Trafficking of Women on Increase,” *Albion Monitor*, 13 March 2000 at www.monitor.net/monitor/0003a/copyright/womenrafficking.html.

⁸ For more information on this issue see Domi T. L., “UN Prostitution Scandal” 20 July 20 2001 at www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/bcr/bcr_20010720_4_eng.txt and Rees M., “Markets, Migration and Forced Prostitution,” *Relief and Rehabilitation Network Newsletter No 14*, June 1999 at www.ODIhpn.org/report.asp?reportID=1054.

focus of the participants was therefore not to spend an inordinate amount of time detailing PKO involvement in trafficking, but rather the focus was to characterize the relationships between the two and then push further into the problems and solutions surrounding trafficking and PKO involvement.

Turning, then, to PKO personnel and trafficking, one participant summarized this discussion perfectly when they said there are two types of PKO involvement. First are activities that PKO personnel engage in, such as purchasing sex or using domestic labor, that can and often do support the trafficking industry. The other form of involvement, which occurs less often than the former according to the experts, is PKO personnel actually engaging in trafficking in persons.

The history of the UN presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an informative example of how both of these forms of involvement in trafficking not only exist but feed off one another. Since the entry of international personnel in 1995, there has been documented proof of the use of brothels by PKO personnel.⁹ In fact, one expert from the region noted that NGO research showed that since 1995, 90% of the use of brothels in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be attributed to PKO personnel. The same expert went on to describe how nightclubs appeared in villages with proximity to bases for PKO personnel. No clubs had existed in these villages before. While local citizens at first thought the nightclubs were a good idea and were proud that some of their own had found a way to earn money from the PKO personnel, they soon learned that the women working in the nightclubs were not being paid and, in many

⁹ For more see Finn P., “Sex Slavery Flourishes in Kosovo,” *Washington Post*, April 24, 2000 at www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/ukraine/sskos.htm and Domi T. L.

cases, were enslaved from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such discoveries led local NGOs to begin focusing on the trafficking issue.

Some change has occurred in the intervening years, but trafficking still remains a significant problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another expert from the region noted, for example, that just last year the IPTF estimated that the percentage of 30% of the people using brothels were PKO personnel (a decrease from the prior year), but that 70% of the money brothels earned in a year came from PKO personnel. The business savvy of these traffickers led one expert to describe them as “the best capitalists in the world.” So while profit is a significant reason behind the continuation of the trafficking industry in the region, another is that until 1998 UNMIBH did not include trafficking as a priority issue. As one expert put it, gender was a non-issue from the formation of the Dayton Peace Accords at the very start— a rather surprising fact given that the Fourth World Conference on Women had been held earlier in 1995 and that the UNMIBH’s mandate had clear language on protecting the rights of women. A change occurred in 1998 when the UN/OHCHR created the gender coordination board that, among other responsibilities, developed a program on trafficking in persons but, as we shall see in the next section, it was not a dramatic change.

Combating Trafficking in the Region

The international community has a central role to play in combating the trafficking in persons in the region. Through humanitarian engagement, economic linkages, and the military presence of the two PKO missions, the international community has a stake in seeing local governments develop the capacity to prevent

and prosecute trafficking syndicates. A number of regional initiatives exist that are striving to foster a regional response to trafficking. A quick categorization of those institutions that are often mentioned when discussing anti-trafficking efforts include:

- International organizations, including UN/OHCHR, UNHCR, ILO, WHO and IOM;
- Regional and sub-regional organizations, such as EU, OSCE, and especially the Stability Pact’s Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings and SECI;
- Non-governmental organizations, including both international/regional (e.g. La Strada Foundation and the International Human Rights Law Group) and local (e.g. Lara and Medica Zenica in Bosnia and Herzegovina);
- Peacekeeping military and civilian missions;
- National and local governments, especially domestic law enforcement and other judicial institutions.

While this list is certainly not complete, it does provide a sense of the numerous organizations working to combat the trafficking in persons in the region.

The guiding policy document for the international community’s efforts against trafficking is the soon to enter into force UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, which includes a detailed protocol dedicated to addressing the trafficking in persons.¹⁰ Given that two UN PKOs operate within the region, the

¹⁰ The Convention will enter into force after the ratification of 40 Member States. It, along with its supporting documents (including the trafficking protocol) and progress towards ratification, is available at www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/convention_s.html. For a detailed analysis of the protocol and its attendant documents, see www.hrlawgroup.org/resources/content/Traff_AnnoP_rotocol.pdf.

protocol has had a pronounced effect on shaping the approach of both international and national institutions to countering trafficking. For example, UNMIK used the protocol as the model for its regulations on trafficking—a topic we return to in the next section. Other organizations have contributed policy statements that serve to coordinate efforts of national governments in the region, such as the Stability Pact and SECI. Finally, the local states have formed their own policy documents, oftentimes in coordination with the prior mentioned documents. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina recently developed a national plan of action to combat trafficking in persons.

The international community has also adopted a more proactive approach to anti-trafficking programs, and the participants discussed three of these programs in particular. In 1998, for example, UNMIBH created the trafficking subgroup of the gender coordination board, comprised of the UN/OHCHR, OSCE, UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, and two international NGOs to liaise with local NGOs. The aim of the subgroup was to foster coordination between all these agencies and to enact a coherent anti-trafficking strategy. One outgrowth of the subgroup was the STOP teams, whose purpose was to provide trained teams of law enforcement personnel to conduct brothel raids and other proactive law enforcement against trafficking syndicates. The STOP teams coordinate with local police forces when conducting raids, and then work with IOM to determine if the persons they locate (usually women) are trafficked. A second, similar program is ongoing in Kosovo. In Kosovo, UNMIK Police TPIU works with OSCE and IOM to identify and repatriate trafficked persons, conducting operations that often locate trafficked persons. OSCE then conducts the initial screening to

identify trafficking victims and, if the victims are *willing* to return to their country of origin, they are provided shelter and return through an IOM program.

Some participants noted that asylum is often overlooked as a method of protection for trafficking victims, but is one that is becoming more frequent. According to UNHCR, some trafficked women may in fact be refugees under the 1951 Convention refugee definition, as a result of the trafficking experience and the inability or unwillingness of their country of origin to provide protection from such harm or threat of such harm.¹¹ In this connection, one program that participants discussed is a program in Albania that opens the possibility to victims who fear persecution upon return to seek asylum. The UNHCR in Albania has recently worked with the Albanian government, IOM, and others to create asylum and migration systems. In particular, a pre-screening program is being implemented by UNHCR, IOM, and OSCE and ICMC with governmental structures. The program is an outgrowth of the fact that the Albanian government admitted it could not identify those who were crossing into the country, and that the UN trafficking protocol calls for the establishment of protection regimes (Articles 6-8 and 14). Albania now refers foreign persons intercepted in the country to the UNHCR for interviews and screening. The IOM and ICMC handle those willing to return to their country of origin voluntarily, and those victims with a well-founded fear of return can seek asylum. The program's supporters hope to expand the process, called "pre-screening," to more border crossing points. While Albanian law enforcement is also

¹¹ See the UNHCR "Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-related Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees"; paragraph 18; Geneva, May 2002.

present for the interviews and is an integral part of the pre-screening process, UNHCR is hoping that they will take over the program entirely in late 2003.

Identifying Problems

Having set the context through the background information provided above, the discussion then turned to identifying what core reasons or problems existed that led to the proclivity of trafficking in persons in the SEE region. Special attention was focused on those problems related to or caused by the PKOs.

Lack of Accountability

One of the most significant problems that participants raised a number of times throughout the seminar was the lack of accountability found within the PKO structure. The participants noted that accountability was an issue throughout the levels of bureaucracy—that is, problems existed with both management and staff. More importantly, however, participants found that either the UN or their home nations oftentimes do not hold personnel in the military, civilian, and CivPol/IPTF accountable for their criminal actions. At its root, many participants agreed with one expert's assertion that trafficking has to be recognized as a criminal activity and therefore the UN or member states cannot simply explain away involvement with trafficking.

With regard to PKO personnel, the criminal actions the participants most spoke of was the use of trafficked women for sexual or domestic servitude. While the participants noted that some attempts have been made to prevent this in the PKOs, the attempts often proved an easily overcome hurdle. For example, when participants noted that the US and UK military components of the PKOs did not allow off-duty fraternization and explicitly banned

certain bars and brothels as no-go zones, other participants noted that women were often brought into the bases from the brothels or the no-go zones were ignored. Also consider the observation of one expert that the different agencies comprising PKOs had progressed at different paces concerning prohibitions against relationships with TIP. In surveying the various agencies and relying on experience, the expert noted that the CivPol missions for PKOs had progressed the farthest in terms of creating a comprehensive code of conduct that bans criminal activities (which includes trafficking in persons but does not spell it out explicitly). For other PKO components, bars and coffee shops are listed as “no-go zones” for their personnel, but the experts noted that such policies do not prohibit, for example, the purchase of sex. Furthermore, if a peacekeeper visits a brothel that does not appear on the no-go list, then it is allowable under this policy. The fast moving nature of brothels and other forms of exploitation also makes this type of policy difficult to enforce.

Especially sharp criticism was held out for the private contractors supplementing or overseeing the staffing requirements for the PKOs on behalf of some Member States or providing PKOs with services, equipment and/or supplies. Many of the experts from the region stated that their personnel ignore or flaunt codes of conduct. One participant from the region stated that some employees of Brown and Root, a contractor, were bringing women into Eagle Base in Bosnia and Herzegovina for sexual exploitation—a major problem in their assessment. More recently, two accountants of KPMG, another contractor, members of UNMIBH's civilian mission, were accused of luring high school students into prostitution on false pretexts and of using their diplomatic status to import prostitutes from Romania and Slovakia.

While it was agreed that contractors needed to take more responsibility for the personnel they oversee in PKOs, it was also true that, as one participant put it, every organization in a PKO is a contractor to the UN, and that the UN needed to take swift and sure actions to ensure the accountability of PKO personnel for their actions.

Accountability relies on enforcement mechanisms, but these have also proven ineffective according to the experts. The UN has conducted internal investigations of PKO personnel engaging in or supporting the trafficking in persons, but one participant noted two significant problems with these investigations conducted in Kosovo. First, even when internal investigations are conducted in an even-handed and professional manner, outsiders almost always viewed them with suspicion since the investigations are not conducted in a transparent way. Second, and more important, in the case of police officers, the PKO missions do not administer corrective measures beyond repatriation to the home country. Even this action is often met with resistance due to fears of offending the accused's Member State. As the expert noted, "the punishment does not meet the crime and, in turn, it does not give deterrent to other people who may be tempted to get involved" in trafficking.

Furthermore, the UN loses all control over what happens to the offender if repatriation is carried out and, according to some experts, no criminal charges have ever been enacted by home countries against repatriated peacekeepers for trafficking-related offences. An expert from the region noted a case of three international police officers in Kosovo who were charged with participating in a case involving the trafficking of women from Belgrade into Kosovo for sexual exploitation. After an internal investigation, the three officers who were involved were found to have helped

transport the women into Kosovo and were repatriated home without any further action.

Shortcomings in Legal Capacities

Another issue that drew significant discussion during the two sessions was the legal capacities to adjudicate trafficking cases. A number of the experts elaborated the significant hurdles facing the international community in fostering an efficient system of hearing criminal and other cases in the PKO areas, focusing especially on the high rate of acquittal for trafficking cases in the region. Experts raised a series of shortcomings in the legal system that all called for the continued need for capacity development, training, and in some cases reform.

One set of criticisms focused on culture as an intervening variable. One expert familiar with the legal system in Kosovo noted that there is a lingering suspicion amongst judges that trafficking in persons is nothing more than a prostitution issue—a perception that oftentimes led judges not to take witness statements critical to trafficking cases. Furthermore, witnesses that did provide statements were often not present when the statements were read into court, which was cited as a potential reason for the high acquittal rate in trafficking cases. The same expert went on to note that culture plays a significant role as a roadblock to progress. One example was that in Kosovo, rape victims often received pressure from their family to marry the rapist or were considered a shame on the family. Finally, the cultural differences between members of the UNMIK Police units sometimes created inefficiencies.

Another significant problem resides with the legal system's criminal and procedural codes. In Kosovo, for example, the legal system was practically non-existent when UNMIK was established. The 1989

Yugoslav penal code, which UNMIK relied on to re-establish the system, criminalized prostitution but not trafficking. Therefore, UNMIK drafted Regulation 2001/4, incorporating the UN trafficking protocol, to address the issue of trafficking.¹² A problem arose almost immediately, however, in that the regulation grafted common law onto a civil law system.¹³ Since the latter legal system has no stipulation for mental activity, such as exploitation or reasonable belief, the “rape shield” did not exist as it in fact contradicted the Kosovo procedural code.¹⁴ Furthermore, prosecutors did not have a conspiracy count in the criminal code, a vital tool for the prosecution of trafficking in persons cases. One expert noted that, to date, there had been some 45 prosecutions or cases opened of trafficking in persons. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain conviction rates for these because, since there is no speedy trial in the procedural code, trials can last some one and a half to two years. Finally, participants noted that asset forfeiture was not a tool being used to combat trafficking in the PKO areas, nor are judges closing the premises where trafficking manifests itself (e.g. a brothel or coffeehouse).

¹² The regulation is available at www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg04-01.html.

¹³ The common law system is practiced in the United Kingdom, the US and a number of other former British Colonies. In short, common law represents the law of the courts as expressed in judicial decisions. Past legal decisions provide the primary basis for adjudicating cases. Such practice is contrasted with a civil law system, widely practiced on the continent of Europe, where decisions are based strictly on statutes and other texts.

¹⁴ The “rape shield” was introduced in the US in the 1970s, and is common practice today. The rape shield stipulates that a rape victim’s character, sexual history, and other personal issues are not germane to sexually-related trials and thus are not admissible at trial.

The failure of the international community to engage local governments when developing statutes was a third problem that numerous experts identified in the legal realm. Reflecting back on the development of regulation 2001/4, one expert noted with regret that no effort was made to engage local law enforcement, prosecutor, or judges before the regulation was drafted. If these local specialists had engaged the drafting process, many of the shortcomings in the regulation might have been addressed before its implementation. Another expert noted a similar failure occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which resulted in the UN/OHCHR assuming responsibility for drafting anti-trafficking legislation and working with local governments to create effective tools for judges and prosecutors.

Finally, dual errors led to problems when UNMIK implemented regulation 2001/4 that serves as lessons for the future. First, notwithstanding the existence of three official languages, UNMIK failed to translate the text of regulation 2001/4 from English into the local Albanian and Serbian until 4 or 5 months after it was released. Sadly, this is not uncommon, as one practitioner noted that half of the 2001 regulations and all of the 2002 regulations had yet to be translated. The lack of a public campaign highlighting the serious nature of the trafficking issue also served to retard the implementation of the regulation.

Lack of Political Will

Related to the problems with authority that the experts addressed was that of political will. All agreed that political will was an important component to a successful anti-trafficking effort and that it was lacking in certain important quarters. Many noted that while certain arms of the UN were strong supporters of firm action against trafficking, this hadn’t translated well into relevant

action in some PKOs. Experts from the region and with experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina also noted that UNMIBH has not been a strong supporter of anti-trafficking efforts. One example was that funds to support assistance to victims of trafficking were raised through personal donations from UN/OHCHR and IPTF personnel at first until IOM stepped in to help through an emergency program. Such an example was held out as illustrating the fact that there are no sustained efforts to prevent trafficking.

A far more unsettling episode was cited as further illustration of this lack of political will. After its establishment in 1998, the gender coordination board for trafficking was staffed with low-ranking officials from the agencies, received little support, and was not embedded in the larger efforts to engender rule of law in the country. The board then had to wait until 1999 for the appointment of a gender focal point and, once created, the tasking for the focal point was far too broad, with responsibility for all gender-based violence including trafficking. The office, for example, had to complete all of the interviews of trafficking victims that had escaped from brothels themselves until trained IPTF human rights officers could handle some of the interviews. Then, when the focal point sent what one expert described as “a lot of good information” garnered from the interviews and other sources about the real nature of trafficking in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the higher echelons of the UNMIBH hierarchy, no one acted on it. The information included patterns of data involving names of traffickers, routes, and destinations at bars and brothels from numerous independent sources. When a new head for the focal point entered from the US, Kathryn Bolkovac, she soon sent frank emails to all IPTF contingents detailing PKO personnel

involvement in trafficking and demanding that they act on it. The email got her promptly demoted and eventually removed from the mission.¹⁵ Currently, the gender focal point in UNMIBH and corresponding structures within UN/OHCHR have lost what clout they once held, and this explains why they are not invited into the decision-making on fostering the rule of law and state democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Political will is an issue that does not just reside at the international level—a comprehensive anti-trafficking regime requires the support of the local actors as well. In Kosovo, one expert noted the fact that some of the politicians well accepted by the international community appeared to have linkages to organized crime or, in some cases, traffickers. UNMIK had to invest a lot of time and energy to protect judges and prosecutors from outside influence or harm rather than the construction of the rule of law. Turning next to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the problems appeared much more serious and deeply rooted. The local government in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not wish to engage the issue of trafficking or take it seriously at first. According to one expert from the region, it was the formation of the Stability Pact’s Trafficking Task Force in September 2000 that began to affect change in the local government, and induced it to take responsibility and form a national plan of action to have an integrated approach to dealing with trafficking.

Lack of Law Enforcement Capacities

A related set of problems that participants focused on was the capacity of law enforcement at both the local and international levels to investigate trafficking

¹⁵ In early August 2002, Kathryn Bolkovac won a judgment from a UK court against her demotion that also upheld her accusations against the PKO personnel.

in persons cases. The experts identified some organizational shortcomings. For example, one participant noted that law enforcement in Kosovo had no forensic or crime scene units. However, most of the discussion revolved around operational deficiencies. For example, one expert explained that the inexperience of civilian oversight of the STOP units in Bosnia and Herzegovina had led to underutilization of the strong capabilities these units possessed. They became, in the participant's words, a "little gang of brothel raiders" that deported those found in brothels before interviews were conducted to ascertain whether or not they were trafficked, which in turn led to a sharp decrease in the number of victims approaching IOM and other NGOs for shelter—down to 3 per month at one point according to the expert—because of fear of being deported. Furthermore, the inability or unwillingness to use intelligence collection to identify and pursue the larger structures of the trafficking syndicates has led to considerable frustration amongst the members of the STOP teams, according to the same participant.

Finally, another participant noted that regardless of the whether the law enforcement officer was a member of a local or international agency, and regardless of where they came from originally, overall the knowledge of trafficking in persons, especially how to proactively combat it, was poor. This expert and others well-versed in law enforcement capabilities noted that this lack of awareness translates directly into a capacity gap when trying to deploy officers to enforce anti-trafficking programs and statutes. One local expert noted that when they entered an IPTF station in Bosnia and Herzegovina and asked to speak with the officer in charge of trafficking, they were sent to see the traffic patrol officer. In short, it was a commonly-shared opinion that DPKO needed to insert anti-trafficking

training into the basic and advanced preparatory education that law enforcement officers receive, and that local forces needed similar training seminars.

Lack of a Human Rights Protection Perspective

Several among the experts raised a concern over the lack of a clear perspective of human rights protection when dealing with trafficking victims. Participants noted that states sometimes, after identifying trafficking victims, consider deportation to their countries of origin as the only policy choice, and do not give due consideration to the safety of the victims. Furthermore, not enough attention has been given either to the protection of trafficking victims through general protection regimes envisaged in universal or regional human rights instruments, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the European Convention on Human Rights, etc.

Some experts noted that there is lack of information concerning the fate of victims upon return to their countries of origin and expressed concern over the reports of some being re-trafficked and others suffering reprisals at the hands of their traffickers. One expert identified prompt access to independent legal advice as central to ensuring that the victims have the possibility to fully exercise their rights, including the right not to be returned to a place where physical integrity or freedom may be compromised.

Turning to the region specifically, the absence of proper national systems to protect and assist trafficking victims puts an additional responsibility on the international community as a whole and on organizations that have assistance and return programs. Such programs, two experts noted, should be paired with or contain effective measures to protect victims. One expert noted that PKOs

should be able to contribute not only in anti-trafficking operations, but also in some aspects of victim protection, upon their release from the trafficking rings. Other expert suggested that matters of victim protection should be included in the training programs of international personnel, including PKOs deployed to conflict areas.

Coordination Issues

The next issue that the experts raised during the two days is that of coordination or, in their opinion, the lack thereof. One expert noted that the various agencies in the international community had to work more closely in a comprehensive anti-trafficking effort even though there is not an institutional history for doing so—a fact that might initially lead to tensions. An expert from the region noted that a Bosnian NGO had gone to the IPTF on numerous occasions for help in acting on the information they had gathered on the trafficking issue, but they found that the IPTF did not understand the trafficking issue. This expert went on to note that the rotation of IPTF staff every six months only exacerbated this problem. Another expert noted that information sharing was a form of coordination that was proving problematic within PKOs. The expert noted that very little information was passed between the different national military units in SFOR or KFOR. Information sharing between the military and law enforcement components of the PKOs was even much more problematic.

Other experts focused on the relations between the representatives of the international and local communities. For example, one expert noted that numerous international agencies and NGOs received funding to conduct specific anti-trafficking programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but neither the funding sources nor the NGOs coordinated their efforts with the gender board, and as such undermined its efforts to

form an integrated response to trafficking. Such practices also took money away from the local governments and NGOs, removing one method of reinforcing ownership and obligations for anti-trafficking efforts. Other participants noted that similar errors were made in Kosovo, and similar problems arose in the formation of policies for anti-trafficking in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the Bosnian government had to wait almost a year for UNMIBH to assign a liaison to assist the implementation of the national plan against trafficking.

In the end, one expert provided an interesting observation concerning anti-trafficking efforts and coordination. The expert noted that traffickers operated using public-private partnerships, operating largely in the private sector but, as was noted earlier, utilizing the public sector for protection and legitimization through corruption and cooption. However, the expert then went on to note that anti-trafficking was largely left to the public sector. The expert then noted that the power of the public sector penetrated the social and economic sectors the least, but this was where the private sector in the form of NGOs, social organizations, firms, and businesses had the best penetration. Thus, in the expert's opinion, the coordination between the private and public sectors was vital to fashioning an effective response to trafficking in the PKO areas and beyond.

Structural Issues

Some of the issues that participants discussed concerned the necessity and existence of a PKO anti-trafficking policy or mandate. Some participants noted that the UN should have and could have anticipated the trafficking problem long before entering either Bosnia and Herzegovina or especially Kosovo—the latter given the lessons learned in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One participant in the region noted that, for example, local

NGOs were well aware of the problem of trafficking in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the international peacekeepers role in it, as early as 1995 but a lack of contacts led to a delay in addressing the issue until 1998 and in establishing concrete anti-trafficking programs until 2000. In their minds, such a gap is something that the UN needs to think about *before* entering into a PKO. Such an anticipatory stance would help to prevent the formation of links not only between traffickers and politicians but, more germane to our purposes, between traffickers and peacekeepers.

Another issue was the lack of transparency with which the PKO agencies conducting their anti-trafficking action. One expert noted that the lack of transparency, in many cases, hindered the ability to promote authority vis-à-vis the trafficking issue. When combined with the lack of accountability, real and apparent, the participants felt that the UN had to work to re-establish its credibility to combat the issue and that transparency in its dealing was sorely overdue. In fact, the lack of credibility has led many local government officials and citizens dismissed the actions of the PKO as a “cover up.” Furthermore, this has made the coordination of anti-trafficking efforts through the UN that much more difficult.

Lack of Training

Running through the discussions of capability shortfalls above, the participants noted that training is lacking across the PKO structure. For example, one participant noted that the training of local criminal justice personnel in Kosovo was an issue that needed serious attention because what training is currently conducted focuses on standards and statutes without addressing the basic skills that serve as the building blocs of investigation, prosecution, and adjudication. Furthermore, current training

sessions are usually only day-long and do not have sustained follow-on to answer the many questions students have. Finally, experts noted that training has not yet addressed the vital need of changing attitudes amongst local police and prosecutors. One expert from the region noted the difficulty they often have with getting local prosecutors to take an anti-trafficking case, even when presented with evidence *and* a victim willing and able to testify against their traffickers, because the prosecutors are unaware of the serious nature of trafficking in persons. The same expert noted a similar problem with judges, citing the case of a trafficking case where a judge released the trafficker but jailed the two victims he was caught trafficking into Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The latter is also an example of the second theme from the experts—that training was not even available for many critical elements combating trafficking in persons. For example, one expert noted that many of the military components of the PKOs do not have any training on trafficking in persons, and thus this impacts their ability to recognize trafficking syndicates when they might come across them. Another expert from the region noted that academic institutions in the former Yugoslavia did not have any courses on trafficking in persons. The paucity of training clearly has serious consequences for the victims of trafficking. As one expert from the region noted, when IPTF and UN/OHCHR first began to identify and interview suspected trafficking victims, the lack of a definition of trafficking and their lack of training of how to properly identify a victim led to many miscues, including misidentification and, more than likely, the re-trafficking of victims into the brothels after they had either escaped or been freed.

Finally, the participants identified that where training seminars existed, the

international community often developed and provided them without engaging or consulting with local stakeholders. Hence, many times these trainings were either off target or were dismissed since they were seen as the international community's agenda, not that of the local stakeholders. For example, one participant noted that the Kosovo Justice Training Institute had conducted training seminars on human rights standards rather than on basic legal procedures and texts and, as a result, local judges and lawyers remained ill-equipped to practice law. However, the Institute recently changed its methodology and hired consultants from the region to conduct courses on the basics, which the expert stated is making important progress in improving its training program.

Forming Solutions

The second day of the experts' meeting was spent discussing what remedies the international community required and how best to implement them. Overall, the participants agreed on two broad guidelines. First was that, as the de facto authority in PKO areas, the international community in general and PKOs specifically had to take responsibility for combating trafficking in persons. Second, regardless of what specific policies and programs the meeting proposed, the only way to ensure that PKOs could make progress against trafficking in persons was as part of a more holistic approach. The ways that the experts group viewed the comprehensive program differed, but each approach was complimentary in that it provided the goals for advocating more specific solutions.

One way to frame this issue is as one form of migration. As one participant noted, countries need at least a three-pronged approach to migration—dealing with trafficking specifically, and irregular migration more generally, since these flows

of persons are multinational and complex. The three components, according to the expert, are assistance to trafficked victims, a program to allow for asylum claims to be heard, and a regular migration system. Other participants at the meeting stressed that countries need to consider the demand for trafficked persons as well as the supply if they are going to comprehend the true forces at work, and thus trafficking measures must take account of and address the demands for trafficked persons as well as the reasons that create supplies of persons for trafficking.

The other way that participants framed trafficking in a comprehensive fashion was in terms of the institutions involved, their goals, and their responsibilities. The first involved the agencies that comprise the PKO's structure—military, law enforcement, civilian, political, etc. The overall goal for the meeting participants was to raise awareness and steer policy supporting the eradication of trafficking in persons among the agencies. To this end, the experts felt the institutions should:

1. Strive to increase the transparency and amount of accurate information available concerning the proclivity and seriousness of trafficking in persons;
2. Integrate the combating of trafficking in persons fully into the mandate of the PKO;
3. Provide protection and assistance to victims, particularly where national authorities are unable or unwilling to do so;
4. Strongly back internal policies, codes of conduct, and public statements from the PKO leadership that the involvement of PKO personnel in trafficking in persons will not be tolerated and will be met with swift punishment upon discovery.

In order to accomplish these benchmarks, the experts felt that PKOs needed to establish a code of conduct, to train

personnel on appropriate strategies for leadership and coordination of field efforts against trafficking, and to enhance the information sharing between leadership and PKO personnel.

The second institutional component was the international community in a larger sense, including IGOs, NGOs, other international organizations, and national governments (especially member states involved in a PKO). Here, the overall goal, it was felt, was to foster regional cooperation around anti-trafficking programs. Such cooperation would facilitate the cultivation of political will supporting anti-trafficking efforts. Amongst a number of programs that are outlined in the following sections, the participants felt that training here should focus on the leadership, in order to foster more informed policy decisions, and the personnel sent to PKO areas.

Finally, experts identified local institutions as the third critical component to constructing an effective anti-trafficking program, with both governmental and non-governmental institutions playing vital roles. While the public sector - government agencies and the like - can use its authority to conduct traditional policing and prosecution activities, the depth of the contributions from non-governmental organizations should not be overlooked. From providing protection and assistance to victims and conducting research to journalists reporting on trafficking to academic institutions providing instruction to students on how it operates, the non-governmental sector is an important part of the local capacity that one has to consider when analyzing a comprehensive anti-trafficking program.

The two views of comprehensiveness drove the experts to make a series of more specific recommendations that the remainder of this section address. The comprehensive

institutional design drove an especially detailed discussion of how to implement and leverage training programs—the last topic addressed in the following list. However, training works best when it is split into efforts to build capacity and to strengthen political will. In the end, this was an most important finding in terms of fashioning an all-inclusive approach and led to the design of a proposal to build a comprehensive training program for PKOs around the globe (see Appendix B).

Improving Mandates

The first topic was the need to construct better mandates and adjust existing ones. The experts agreed that criminal justice issues received only marginal attention in the construction of PKO mandates, with trafficking in persons getting little to no consideration. The experts agreed that anti-trafficking has to become an integral part of the PKOs' mission and the larger plan of post-conflict reconstruction, and thus the insertion of anti-trafficking language into PKO mandates. Another expert identified a related problem—that mandates are often drawn up by those with little to no knowledge of the local context, and thus are often difficult to implement when exposed to the local conditions. Hence, the expert recommended that those drafting mandates take the situation on the ground into consideration—an important consideration especially in terms of crafting anti-crime and anti-trafficking goals.

Other experts had suggestions on how to improve mandates so that they would be more applicable after implementation and as post-conflict reconstruction commenced. One participant noted that the international community needs to do a better job of identifying the ways that the informal sector operates, especially in terms of money flows, and the major power brokers in the informal sector. Such analysis would have

to start before the PKO entered the country, and would require an expert team from the region to assist it. The relevance to trafficking, as other experts noted, is that trafficking syndicates largely operate through the informal sectors of the economy and therefore such information should lead to operations that prevent traffickers from operating in the informal sector. Furthermore, since the international community often wishes to hold elections early in order to solidify the local power structure, it is important to try to identify those actors cooperating with or sympathetic to traffickers and other forms of organized crime in order to prevent them from using their offices to assist criminal enterprises.

Fostering Local Capacities

A second issue that experts discussed is the need to foster local capacities to fight trafficking and to forge linkages to the multilateral community. Experts at the meeting approached this issue by deconstructing the local institutions and identifying the ways that the international community can best support the anti-trafficking programs of local institutions. One was the NGO community, whom the experts saw as a valuable service provider but also an important source of information. By supporting the research programs of local NGOs and assisting in the broader publication of this information, the international community can help bolster public awareness of the issue and empower the local voices seeking to counter trafficking. For example, one expert noted that the research of a number of NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina proved vital to the international community's understanding of trafficking in the region, and the international community is working with the group to identify gaps in their research and plan future efforts. Another expert stated that the international community should

continue to support NGOs' provision of public health services to trafficking victims. Another expert finally noted that academic institutions served a similar purpose as they produced both research and training, and thus the international community should also consider this group as another avenue for anti-trafficking programs.

While most experts agreed that the local NGO community was contributing a sustained anti-trafficking program with the less-than-ample resources available to them, others were more sanguine when the focus shifted to the states in the region. Experts stated that there is little to no capacity to fight trafficking in persons at the national level, and in some cases also to provide protection to victims. One expert noted that the governments' resources are by and large linked to the political cycle, and thus anti-trafficking efforts tend to receive attention and resources when elections are coming due. Furthermore, experts returned to the issue of corruption—an issue that further complicated the ability of local governments to enact strong anti-trafficking policies. However, some experts did note that some states were making more dedicated efforts (e.g. the national plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Albanian pre-screening program) and that the continuation of efforts to build the rule of law would continue to strengthen anti-trafficking efforts.

One final sector of the local community that is important to combating trafficking, especially again as a source of research and enhancing public awareness, was the media. The participants spoke of the work of responsible investigative journalism in the SEE region. One expert, for example, spoke of a Croatian journalist who, after receiving training on how the trafficking in persons operates, conducted an investigation and published evidence of an organ trafficking network operating in the region. Other experts noted the role of the

media publishing in international news outlets, providing information from or to other regions and providing the public the ways that trafficking syndicates operate internationally. The panelists agree that the international community had to continue to provide media training seminars that specifically addressed the trafficking in persons as well as to continue to foster a free and responsible journalism community

Improving Coordination

A third issue that arose during the discussion was the need to improve the coordination of efforts against trafficking. The participants spoke of coordination occurring both within and between institutions at all levels of PKOs. Improving coordination among institutions in the local communities has already reaped benefits. For example, one expert from the region relayed that NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina had met to try to establish burden sharing and best leverage their resources, leading to the assignment of education to one group of NGOs, sheltering to another, advocacy and public awareness another, and so on. Each group internally nominated a coordinator, and the coordinators regularly discuss their progress with the other groups. International coordination among NGOs is also vital, as one expert noted that NGOs often fulfill similar roles in origin countries to those described above, and can therefore assist in comparative analysis or assistance to returning victims. Another expert stated that more coordination between local law enforcement agencies and prosecutors, especially in the form of a task force involving the international community, was necessary.

Another form of coordination that the participants discussed was the formation of public-private partnerships to leverage the strengths of different organizations. For example, an expert noted that the US

Federal Bureau of Investigation had crafted a questionnaire for NGOs to gather information about the victims they encountered. The questionnaire, which SECI's anti-trafficking task force implemented after meeting with the US Department of Justice, has led to better information sharing and coordination among NGOs and local law enforcement agencies. Another expert noted that governments should recognize that human rights NGOs serve as moral entrepreneurs that can serve as independent monitors of codes of conduct and improve the transparency of their enforcement. Another participant noted that the ILO has held two productive meetings in East Asia that brought private sector leaders together with government officials to discuss ways they could jointly implement programs to combat trafficking in persons.

Finally, there is the problem of interagency coordination within PKOs. Here, the primary focus is placed on the law enforcement and military components. Many experts felt it was most necessary to define role for both the military and the law enforcement PKO components in a larger anti-trafficking program. One expert illustrated this well when they stated the military can proactively contribute more to anti-trafficking efforts but, until its role is clearly defined, the military will likely continue to turn over information it obtains on trafficking syndicates to law enforcement when the situation dictates.

Structural and Programmatic PKO Changes

The experts made a number of suggestions as to how to try and bring innovation or change into the PKO in order to best facilitate anti-trafficking activities. For example, one participant noted that the ILO had created a new program to try to reduce trafficking in the SEE region by creating secure job opportunities and training,

education, and microcredits in the origin countries of trafficking victims. Other participants made suggestions for changing the structure of PKOs. For example, one expert raised the question of why more women were not in the military component of PKOs, and another relayed that DPKO was studying the issue and trying to encourage member states to second more women to the missions. DPKO is also focusing on placing more law enforcement experts in the chain of command for the PKO that can improve the criminal justice missions. Finally, one expert had earlier mentioned the desire to have dedicated units enforcing codes of conduct in the missions.

Fostering Political Will

Implementing institutional changes and counter trafficking programs require strong political support. Measures of political will often reveal that governments from the international to the local level around the globe consider trafficking in persons a scourge, but the competition from other serious issues oftentimes forces trafficking down on the list of priorities. The experts attending the meetings felt that steps were necessary to ensure that governments indeed understood the gravity of the situation and the ways that trafficking is impacting their jurisdictions and their missions in order to bolster the will to combat it.

The recommendations that the experts made spanned all levels of government. Starting with the UN system, the experts felt that Member States should issue resolutions to make anti-trafficking a more integral part of PKO preparations. Proposed measures included, but were not limited to, adopting an anti-trafficking code of conduct, mechanisms for its enforcement, and training of all PKO personnel. Other experts noted that the UN need the Member States to make budgetary changes to support such efforts. One expert noted that the UN

budget allocates 150 million USD per year for narcotics programs, but other crime programs only receive 5 million USD. One result of such budgeting decisions was that the UN Crime Commission had not yet addressed how trafficking impacts PKOs.

Turning then to the individual member states themselves, the experts noted an increasing focus on trafficking in persons and, more specifically, on trafficking in the context of PKOs. One expert noted that just a week prior to our meeting, the US House of Representatives held a hearing on the same topic.¹⁶ Another expert noted that the US State Department had formed a working group within the government to address specifically the trafficking and PKO issue. However, the experts did have some suggestions on how member states could improve their response to the issue. First, the experts felt that the member states have to demand that something further be done internally to address trafficking in PKO areas. One expert noted that member states should improve oversight of their contractors and subcontractors providing services to PKOs. Another raised the need for better screening of personnel assigned to PKOs, where programs should ensure that the personnel do not have prior or current connections to trafficking or other forms of organized crime and corruption.

Finally, the experts spoke of the need to foster local political will to combat trafficking in the PKO areas. Drawing on their experience of the SEE region, the experts again provided some concrete suggestions. One expert noted that convincing Kosovo's public officials and citizens that the trafficking issue is a problem that impacts them is crucial, but

¹⁶ *The UN and the Sex Slave Trade in Bosnia: Isolated Case or Larger Problem in the UN System?* 24 April 2002. See http://www.house.gov/international_relations/iohr107.htm for the hearing transcript and webcast video.

remains a problem because of the local culture. Therefore, outreach and other programs designed to remove cultural barriers to anti-trafficking efforts should continue to expand in the region. Another expert noted that when the Stability Pact assigned a higher priority to anti-trafficking programs, the government officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina began to take the issue more seriously as well. As evidence, the expert cited the recent formation and implementation of a national plan to combat trafficking in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hence, regional organizations should continue to press the need for coordinated anti-trafficking measures.

Creating Accountability

Another topic that experts focused on when developing solutions was the need to create accountability. Clearly defined, “black and white” as one expert put it, codes of conduct and regulation concerning trafficked persons were essential. Others were concerned with current efforts, especially how the military’s designation of “out of bounds” areas were designated and enforced. A general feeling was that if formal rules were articulated from the leadership of PKO components and related institutions, they would likely translate into practice at lower levels.

This conversation led into a discussion of the need for a “code of conduct” for PKO personnel. The experts noted that accountability for UN personnel is especially important given the fact that they serve as the primary source of authority in PKO areas. One expert stated that the UN needed to codify trafficking in persons specifically as a universal part of codes of conduct. The expert went on to note that while the military personnel in PKOs had not done this, the CivPol members did—illustrating that the missions set their own policies at the moment. Participants did note, however, that DPKO has an ongoing

working group to draft a stronger code of conduct that is taking the issue of trafficking in persons seriously as part of their effort.

Some discussion arose about the role of prostitution in terms of a code of conduct. One expert asked why the UN did not just ban PKO personnel from purchasing sex. Other experts noted that the military components from certain member states had such prohibitions as a part of their own codes of conduct. Other experts disagreed that this was the proper course of action, however, noting that trafficking in persons was more complex than just the purchase of sex. Rather, they wished to place emphasis on trafficking as one of a number of specific criminal activities that a code of conduct would prohibit PKO personnel from engaging in. Another expert noted that the US State Department’s policy of “zero tolerance” for trafficking and other criminal activities served as one example of this approach. Finally, there was the issue of contractors. The experts noted that the UN should have the ability to require contractors to adhere to an anti-trafficking policy as a condition of their contract. For example, the ILO has its contractors sign an agreement prohibiting them from using child labor, and this should serve as a model for PKOs.

Once a code of conduct is developed, the participants noted, it has to have two things to work—political support from the leadership and an enforcement mechanism to carry it through. Having discussed support in the prior section, a number of suggestions arose concerning the mechanisms for enforcing the code of conduct. First, some experts stated that the UN should consider a waiver of immunity where cases warrant, such as engaging in trafficking in persons. In Kosovo, one expert noted, two waivers of immunity had been made—one for a Rwandan accused of genocide and a second for the rape of a 14-year old trafficked girl. Immunity is

designed to protect PKO personnel from politically-motivated prosecutions, not shield personnel from prosecution for criminal activities, and using the waiver appropriately to enforce this standard would improve the authority the PKO holds in the region.

Another idea for the enforcement of a code of conduct was the establishment of an Inspector General position in PKOs. The DPKO is considering two methods for enforcing codes of conduct: either establishing an Inspector General in each PKO mission or recruiting experienced officers from internal affairs units in member states and deploying them as an office that was independent of the policing mission. Another expert related that UNMIK had a permanent OIOS office. While successful, others thought the idea was not likely a viable alternative because OIOS is charged with overseeing all forms of misconduct throughout the UN and thus is not likely to be able to provide the types of specific support that an OIG or internal affairs unit assigned to a PKO could.

Training

Training served as a running theme throughout the meeting, and was especially prominent in the discussions of other required components to an anti-trafficking program for PKOs. The discussions of training proper, however, revolved around a handful of questions. First was who requires training and for what purpose. Some experts focused on local institutions such as law enforcement, government, NGOs, the media, and students/academicians as the primary locus for training. One expert from the region, for example, noted that while the IPTF and STOP teams had made some progress, training of local law enforcement officers and superiors on the basics of trafficking and how to investigate trafficking cases was vital to expanding their

effectiveness. The same expert also noted that municipal government officials needed training as they license and regulate nightclubs, coffee shops, and other places where trafficking victims are often located. Other experts, however, chose to focus on the international community within PKOs, especially the law enforcement, military, and civilian components as a locus for training. For example, one participant noted that CivPol already has some initial training for members entering PKOs, but that anti-trafficking needed to be integrated into this and follow-on trainings. In the end, the experts agreed that both communities need training and, in some cases, joint training would create added benefits for both groups.

The discussion next turned to what kinds of training were necessary. Most experts agreed that two types of trainings were required—those to raise awareness and those to build capabilities. Providing information about trafficking in persons, especially its impact on victims, can help to improve understanding, as was discussed in the section addressing political will. For example, providing such trainings to government officials also often provide models for the ways that governments can respond to trafficking. As another expert noted, providing trainings to civic groups to raise public awareness can help to create larger support for anti-trafficking programs and research. The short-term goal of these awareness trainings is to create a change in practice, for example to increase interagency efforts, and the medium to long-term goal is to help foster a change in attitudes.

The more common form of training, however, is that to create or reinforce skills and to provide knowledge with the goal of creating or building capacities to act against trafficking. As a number of experts noted throughout the meeting, constituencies from the local and international communities require such skill trainings to create a more

effective anti-trafficking regime. For example, one expert noted that while the meetings had focused on some PKO personnel as users of trafficked persons, the same personnel have an important role to play in combating trafficking. Therefore, training sessions need to engage these groups to provide them law enforcement investigation techniques, prosecution strategies, and ways to implement protection and assistance to victims. In the end, the experts agreed that both types of trainings, when combined with the audiences identified above, formed the outline for a model comprehensive anti-trafficking training regimen for PKOs. The concept is reflected in the program design in Appendix B and the chart attached as Appendix C.

The experts also weighed in on the different forms that training can and should take place in. First, the experts agreed that both classroom style and manual-based trainings were appropriate. Since the UN already has PKO manuals, one expert noted, they should have chapter that clearly and forcefully explains the responsibilities that PKO personnel have in countering trafficking. Other experts noted that there should be an improvement in and standardization of the DPKO training regimen that would include mandatory pre-deployment and in-service training as well—the latter involving local law enforcement, government officials, and other agents important to combating trafficking—delivered by dedicated training units detailed to the PKOs. Finally, many experts stressed the need for case based trainings, which would illustrate the detrimental impact trafficking has on victims. The experts went on to note that victims have a wealth of information to share in this and other regards, and therefore every effort should be made to have them involved in the design and implementation of training.

Finally, as the experts drew on their experience, they noted that a diversity of training programs already existed. The training products they identified varied in terms of emphasis (e.g. victims assistance and protection, prosecution), depth (e.g. one-day summary versus multi-day tutorial), quality, and regional focus. Therefore, the experts agreed that a repository that could identify and analyze these products would allow PKOs to draw on existing training product by contacting those stakeholders that could provide training. The repository's analysis could also identify where gaps existed and recommend or develop its own training seminar to fill those voids. The repository would therefore act as a clearinghouse for any and all organizations, governmental or non-governmental, that sought training on trafficking in persons.

Conclusion

In later 2002, the EU will assume control of the international police operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The handover will be significant in many ways, and many new international police officers will arrive in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Afghanistan, numerous international troops have arrived to support the post-Taliban government, and an international policing and peace force is being mulled over by the international community. In East Timor, a new UN PKO (UNMISSET) has taken up residence as of May 2002 and will assist the newly established independent country over a period of two year to model public service and law enforcement agencies. Since autumn 1999, three major PKOs were established in Africa: UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo and UNMEE at the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea. While pursuing the most commendable mandate to preserve and foster peace, around the globe, then, new missions and new deployments

risk to add up to new opportunities to traffickers and organized crime.

Clearly, the problems, issues, and solutions that the experts addressed during this meeting go far beyond the borders of the SEE region. New legal systems and police techniques will continue to prove difficult to master for local forces. Crime will continue to compete with other political issues for support from governments. Difficulties will arise in coordinating the efforts of numerous public and private entities in the PKO missions. And, unfortunately it seems, trafficking will continue to supply the brothels outside the PKO bases.

What arose from this meeting, and what the experts hope will continue, was a process for developing and implementing a training-based comprehensive program to address and combat the trafficking in persons in PKO missions. Training, of course, is not a panacea—it has to operate in conjunction with numerous other programs

and efforts. It is, however, a simple way to improve capabilities, to harness political support, and to foster coordination and understanding between the international and local communities.

All agreed, however, that while the international community has begun to take a defined, comprehensive stance against trafficking in persons in general, it needed to make a special effort to address the trafficking in persons in PKO areas. With all of the issues and evidence that the experts addressed, none was as devastating to consider than the effect that trafficking in persons has on a core mission of PKOs—reconstructing respect of the rule of law. The trafficking in persons significantly undermines this crucial goal of PKOs and should therefore, among the other important reasons this report identifies, trigger a swift and sure response from the international community.

**Appendix A: Participants of the First Meeting of the Expert Working Group
UNICRI (Turin, Italy)
9-10 May 2002**

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Appendix B: Trafficking in Persons and Peacekeeping Operations- A Comprehensive Awareness and Training Program

Introduction

The trafficking in persons is perhaps the most heinous form of transnational organized crime. Victims of trafficking—men, women, and children—are betrayed and demeaned in profound ways. Trafficking victims are stripped of their most basic human rights, those of self-determination and in many cases life itself. Victims of trafficking are frequently beaten and raped. They often turn to substance abuse as the only means of escaping their situation. Victims of trafficking for sex, in particular, often become infected with sexually transmitted and other serious diseases like AIDS. Worst of all, victims must endure a subhuman existence from which few emerge either alive or healthy. The trafficking in persons industry is widespread. A recent US report listed 84 countries as home to significant numbers of victims. The industry affects close to 700,000 persons annually from both genders and numerous socioeconomic classes while ignoring other typical social determinants as religion, class, and race. The conclusion is as simple as it is frightening—trafficking is a global phenomenon with ever-increasing deleterious consequences.

One aspect of this phenomenon that is at the earliest stages of recognition is the trafficking in persons into peacekeeping areas. Three observations characterize the relations between PKOs and trafficking in persons. First, in contemporary PKOs like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor, the international community is the primary (or only) source of law enforcement, making PKOs the primary law enforcement authority for combating trafficking. Second, because PKOs are paid at a high wage in the context of the localities they serve in, they knowingly or unknowingly serve as a primary source of demand for trafficked persons in brothels and domestic labor, for example. Finally, in some cases, members of PKOs have been implicated in trafficking themselves. Examples include peacekeeping units transporting victims and contractors supporting peacekeepers purchasing trafficked women and children.

On May 9th and 10th of 2002, UNICRI and TraCCC of American University convened a focus group of international experts to address how to leverage training regimens to combat the trafficking in persons, especially women, in the context of PKOs. Participants used the situation in the Balkans as a point of reference and focused on three topics. First was to allow experts from the local and international communities to further clarify the relations between PKOs and trafficking in persons. Second, the experts provided key information about current capabilities to combat trafficking and the major gaps. Finally, the group reinforced the importance of providing training for members of institutions at all levels of the local and international communities to build capacities and improve the recognition of and response to trafficking in persons.

Program Goals

The proposal outlines a series of five parallel activities supporting a singular goal—a transparent and effective anti-trafficking training framework for all members of peacekeeping operations and corresponding local institutions around the globe in order to (1) raise visibility/awareness of the issue within peacekeeping regions and (2) to create or bolster anti-trafficking capacities.

From the results of the first international experts meeting, it is clear that a training regimen must target a broad audience to achieve the desired goal of mitigating the trafficking in persons within peacekeeping regions. Especially important are the self-reinforcing processes of

building political will and the capacities to act on that support. Enhanced through training, information sharing, and professional development, political will is vital for the implementation of successful anti-trafficking operations (e.g. law enforcement or prosecution). In return, the implementation of successful anti-trafficking programs reinforces the political will to support their continued success. Political will, in its many forms of expression, can reduce the behaviors that condone and support trafficking and related forms of organized crime.

Despite the best efforts of some member states and related institutions, strategies to form a comprehensive anti-trafficking framework for PKOs are falling well short of the demand. The deficiencies identified during the experts meeting included shortfalls or absence of political will, uneven application of existing training regimens within and across institutions, and a failure to engage local institutions in a fruitful manner. Addressing such a need is further hampered by a lack of knowledge of ongoing or proposed training curricula across measures of effectiveness.

Addressing these deficiencies, the training framework will address the vertical chains of command from policymakers to practitioners with the flexibility to achieve differing goals that recognize missions throughout a variety of institutions:

- Policymakers and managers—the primary goal is increasing awareness and generating political will to support enforceable anti-trafficking codes of conduct and training alongside the implementation of adequate protection for victims;
- Military, police, and civilian personnel of the international community—the primary goal is to raise awareness of anti-trafficking codes of conduct and to implement effective anti-trafficking measures in concert with local institutions;
- Local law enforcement and NGO personnel—the primary goal is to build capacities for recognizing and combating trafficking effectively with particular attention to the protection and assistance of trafficking victims, including enforcement of codes of conduct.

Program Structure

The proposed program that follows seeks to meet the above-stated goals to implement a comprehensive and effective training program. Starting with identification and analysis of existing training capabilities, the program moves through parallel processes of constructing political will, institutional capacities, and awareness across the organizations attempting to reduce these criminal activities.

The proposed program is designed to provide training and information for all members of PKOs around the globe, but in order to focus design and implementation in as little time required, it is prudent to select a region of the globe as a test platform. For these purposes, the UNICRI-TraCCC team selected the SEE region due to its proximity to the centers, the presence of two different forms of PKOs, and the familiarity each center has with the situation in the region. As such, the program is intended to initially address the SEE region, but is means to the larger end of a fully-implemented program training all members of current, and more importantly future, PKOs.

1. *Compiling, Analyzing, and Disseminating Trafficking Curricula*

The first step in the program is to discover those training materials serving the anti-trafficking community and analyze their contents. The repository will open with the collection of materials related to the topics of trafficking in persons *and* peacekeeping. The primary purpose of the repository is to serve as the information foundation for the entire project, serving both the UNICRI-TraCCC team and the users of our project.

The repository will first and foremost seek out anti-trafficking existing training materials (e.g., those from TraCCC, Interpol, the OSCE, IOM, the US State Department, etc.) designed for a comprehensive range of audiences (e.g. law enforcement, prosecutors, victims services providers) and purposes (e.g. awareness construction, capacity building). The collection will also include information sources consisting of:

- Bibliographic information on trafficking research reports and methodologies;
- Compilations of raw data;
- A roster of experts and organizations working in the region.

As accessibility to the repository is a primary goal, the team intends to make as many resources as possible available through the Internet, through UNICRI, the intended storehouse for these materials, will also catalog hard-copies of reports and training products in its library.

Alongside the commitment to access through the Internet, it is hoped that the most valuable training materials will migrate to a distance learning format. Educational technology offers the opportunity to distribute effective training widely on flexible platforms for both new audiences and those seeking to reinforce prior learning. Sound instructional design and prudent use of educational technology offers the opportunity to reach broader audiences with proven effectiveness—in both live and remote learning venues. Design and technology can enhance the face-to-face programs and provide information and training to those audiences at distant locations. For the peacekeeping mission, drawing on geographically dispersed nations, distance learning offers an opportunity to provide effective and consistent training to all participants. Depending on content, culture and other requirements, these training programs can be offered synchronously or asynchronously, with either approach offering the opportunity for continued or extended learning as required or for those seeking such levels of knowledge. To overcome differences in Internet access and technology capabilities, the team will develop both Internet-based and CD-Rom versions of the training materials. We anticipate the development of courses for such audiences as law enforcement, military, NGOs, prosecutors, civilian PKO members, researchers, trainers and academics.

Analysis of the training materials and information, the second key component of the repository, will provide annotations of contents and descriptions for each product or record in the repository. Analysis of the collection will review the information content and effectiveness of each document and training curriculum for two reasons. For users, the annotations will enable quick and concise scanning and access to the information and application in the repository. For UNICRI-TraCCC, the analysis will identify best practices in the existing training regimens as well as serve as the foundation for the program's comprehensive training regimen. An early proposed draft framework for analysis is attached as Appendix B to this proposal.

In order to maintain, update, and conduct the initial analysis of materials, the team anticipates hiring a dedicated analyst at UNICRI who will take primary responsibility for the collection, cataloguing and analysis of materials in the repository. TraCCC intends to provide its own training materials and vast information sources to the repository, and will also assist with the analysis function of the repository. The repository will initially store materials and records in their original language(s) with English translations, as well as all abstracts and analyses. Once established, UNICRI will translate the records into other languages, including but not limited to French, Spanish, German, Chinese, and Russian.

2. Constructing & Implementing a Training Regimen for PKOs

The early analytical results from the repository will identify existing training materials that will begin to populate a model for a comprehensive training for PKOs. The logical follow-on task is to improve and/or update existing curricula to leverage them for maximum effect, develop new training regimens where none exist, and then implement the curricula through training seminars held in both PKO regions for current peacekeeping personnel and at the UN so that future personnel receive this training in the course of their normal pre-mission briefings.

The majority of this work will fall to TraCCC and its partner, the Academic Consortium for Global Education (ACGE), the latter drawing on the vast resources of its member institutions and experience in leveraging education technology for tested and effective training regimens. The second part of the program will:

- Improve and disseminate effective existing training regimens to target audiences;
- Identify and support local institutions developing training curricula in PKO regions;
- Construct new training instruments for specific audiences addressing gaps revealed from the analysis of existing training instruments;
- Providing instructional design and educational technology expertise to support and enhance training effectiveness and retention;
- Implement the comprehensive training regimen.

The vertical axis of Appendix C provides the intended *audience* for the comprehensive regimen. In summation, it spans the international and local communities to include direct PKO participants in the law enforcement, civilian, and military spheres. The other intended audience involves key players in the broader struggle against trafficking in persons, specifically NGOs, journalists, and academics.

While the intention is to design a model training regimen early-on in the project, the vision of such a regime focuses on two goals—construction of awareness and capacities. In some cases, such as high-level policymakers and supervisors, awareness is important in order to foster the political will to act on the issue. Likewise, as one moves into the practitioner community, the goal of building capacities is primary—providing the tools and information necessary, for example, to open and see-through a trafficking in persons case.

Turning, then, to implementation, the project envisions a two track approach. First, the program will turn its attention to the PKOs already deployed, such as in Southeastern Europe and East Timor. Along with its own personnel, UNICRI and TraCCC will assemble a briefing team of approximately 6 members drawn from law enforcement, prosecution/legal scholars, NGOs, military/PKOs, and others to implement training of international and local members of the audience discussed above in the PKO region. The goal of each of these training sessions will be to cycle 3 classes of 50-100 students through 4-day training seminars. TraCCC will identify at least 2 PKOs as target recipients for these trainings late in year 1 or early in year 2, with priority going to those areas where trafficking in persons is prevalent or conditions for trafficking are dire. Contingent on funding, TraCCC will continue to perform these seminars, with priority going to those PKOs that have not received such training.

Second, TraCCC and ACGE intend to work with UN headquarters staff to implement trafficking in persons training into its existing training seminars. To meet this goal, TraCCC-ACGE will provide well-designed and tested curricula that the UN can implement through the distribution of its own written materials and training modules. Again, a dual focus of consciousness/awareness and capacity building will drive these training materials geared towards the military, law enforcement (e.g. CivPol) and civilian members of PKOs.

3. Constructing Awareness and Political Will

The final component of this proposal is to host a conference that seeks to enhance the political will to carry through a comprehensive training program. To this end, the team plans to coordinate with a program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) to bring together supervisory officials from the military, police, and civilian sectors of countries providing personnel to PKOs, major international governmental and nongovernmental organizations providing services to PKOs, and ranking local officials from throughout the same spectrum providing local capabilities to combat trafficking in persons.

At the meeting, the team intends to provide intensive informational training to the attendees to show how trafficking in persons operates within PKOs, the current status of efforts within the local and international communities to combat it, and the how the comprehensive training program will move to address gaps between the two. Discussions of the need for technical assistance and other crucial supporting functions are also anticipated to occur during this meeting.

Intended outcomes of this meeting include increased awareness and, most importantly, an enhanced political will among key actors to address the issue of trafficking in persons in PKOs. Such awareness and engagement is vital to the effectiveness of all anti-trafficking efforts at a variety of levels. Furthermore, either this or a parallel conference will include key decisionmakers from local institutions to ensure that both the international and local communities are moving forward on the issue simultaneously and in a coordinated fashion. Finally, the meeting will serve as a preparation for the CSIS project, which will bring together high-ranking military officials from NATO countries to discuss the trafficking in persons issue and how they can contribute to combating it.

4. Focus Group Meetings

Once TraCCC and UNICRI establish criteria for collection and analysis vis-à-vis the repository, a second meeting of the international experts focus group that gathered in Turin May 9-10 is in order. The main thematic points for the second meeting relate to the following strategic and content issues:

- Preparation of the consciousness and awareness conference(s);
- Training for increasing compliance with codes of conduct, especially on the civilian side of PKOs—a topic that received little attention at our first meeting;
- Results of the initial analysis of other training efforts and how to move forward rapidly to address these holes in the matrix shown earlier;
- Outline plans for the formation of interagency task forces between international agencies, local institutions, and the NGO community in order to define and support roles each can play in effective anti-trafficking efforts and to create a foundation upon which to begin implementation of training materials.

The list of attendees for this second meeting is likely to include more local NGO and law enforcement representatives, and should also engage the officers responsible for personnel overseeing the contractors and subcontractors in the region to raise this issue again for discussion. A third meeting of the working group is also planned for year 2, mainly to mark progress to date and revisit many of the same issues listed above.

Timeline and Budget

The program as outlined sets out to attempt to bring change and improve anti-trafficking measures as soon as possible. As the timeline shows, the program will involve a serious and dedicated effort from the start with the emphasis on focusing the development of awareness and capabilities building early in the 2-year program.




Figure 1: Project Timeline

Starting from the top of Figure 1, the program will begin with the ramping up of the repository and, as the team collects and catalogues materials, analyzing the contents for the development of the comprehensive training program. UNICRI-TraCCC anticipates that within 6 months of this effort, the analysis will yield what gaps exist in training and will allow for the development of new training materials. Furthermore, the team also anticipates that, by month 6, some of the training materials collected for the repository will prove ready for implementation, and will work with the original authors of the training materials to implement their delivery to the appropriate audiences. Both these efforts will continue through the remainder of year 1 and will serve as the primary function for year 2. During year 2, it is anticipated that UNICRI-TraCCC will expand the comprehensive training regimen to other PKOs currently underway around the globe. During these efforts, a number of key meetings (described above) will help to steer the program.

Conclusion

The proposal seeks to address the often competing goals of moving fast yet constructing sustainability. In our opinion, the current and continued incremental adjustments and additions to the efforts to counter trafficking in persons in peacekeeping regions will not solve the current shortfalls. What is necessary, therefore, is a “big idea”—one that will entice policymakers and provide the tools and capabilities necessary to make real progress. This proposal is one such

“big idea.” The end goal, therefore, is not to address the trafficking situation in SEE alone, but rather to create a model of information, training, and professional development for the rapid construction and deployment of anti-trafficking awareness and capabilities for other current and future peacekeeping operations.

Appendix C: Draft Analytic Framework for Evaluating Training Regimens

Audiences Who are they?	Information Exchange Develop & analyze current programs and activities (gap analysis)		Outcomes What do you want them to do?		Content What do they need to know to do it?		Methods How do you deliver the information?		Assessment What is the extent of accomplishment?	
	Goal	Strategy	Goal	Strategy	Goal	Strategy	Goal	Strategy	Goal	Strategy
Military Senior Level/Policy										
Police Senior Level/Policy Law Enforcement										
Civilian Sr. Level/Management Contractors Employees										
Local Law Enforcement Prosecutors Defense Attorneys										
NGOs (Local and International)										
Journalists										
Academic										